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Chevron, Greenwashing, and the Myth of 










As green business practices grow in popularity, so does the temptation 
to “greenwash” one’s business to appear more environmentally and socially 
responsible than it actually is. We examined this phenomenon in an earlier 
paper, using BP and the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe as a case study and 
developing a framework for policing dubious claims of corporate social 
responsibility. This Article revisits these issues focusing on Chevron, an oil 
company that claims in its advertisements to care deeply about the 
environment and the communities in which it operates, even as it faces an 
$18 billion judgment for polluting the Ecuadorean Amazon and injuring its 
people. After describing Chevron’s “we agree” advertising campaign, the 
Article sets out our framework for approaching “faux” corporate social 
responsibility, gauges whether misled consumers and investors might have a 
legal remedy as a result of Chevron’s advertising claims, and proposes 
refinements to better regulate corporate greenwashing. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
In the wake of the 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, amid public 
backlash directed at BP in particular and the oil industry in general, the 
Chevron Corporation rolled out a series of new advertisements broadly 
agreeing with this popular sentiment and inviting critics to learn the 
company’s positions on the environment and other sensitive subjects.
1
 
According to a company press release, “[t]he campaign highlights the 
common ground Chevron shares with people around the world on key energy 
issues.”
2
 “We hear what people say about oil companies—that they should 
develop renewables, support communities, create jobs and protect the 
environment—and the fact is, we agree.”
3
 
One of the advertisements touts Chevron’s commitment to renewable 
energy, “agreeing” that we need to develop affordable, viable alternatives to 
fossil fuels now, describing its progress in this area, and noting that it has 
invested millions of dollars towards this end.
4
 Along similar lines, another 
advertisement focuses on technology, “agreeing” that the company must 
think like a technology company and making the case that it currently 
                                                                                                                                      
 1. See Advertising: The Power of Human Energy, CHEVRON CORP., 
http://www.chevron.com/about/advertising (last visited Sept. 4, 2011) (linking to the television 
and print advertisements that form Chevron’s “we agree” campaign) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). As to the timing of the 
campaign, see Ben Casselman, Chevron Ad Campaign Answers Critics Head-On, WALL ST. J., 
OCT. 18, 2010, at B10, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304250404575558363902469440.html 
(“[T]he campaign comes as the industry is trying to recover from the [BP oil spill, 
which] . . . only worsened the image of an industry that the public has consistently ranked dead 
last among 25 business sectors . . . .”). 
 2.  See Chevron Launches New Global Advertising Campaign: “We Agree,” CHEVRON 
CORP. (Oct. 18, 2010), 
http://www.chevron.com/chevron/pressreleases/article/10182010_chevronlaunchesnewglobala
dvertisingcampaignweagree.news (last visited Sept. 4, 2011) (introducing the ad campaign) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 3.  See id. (quoting Rhonda Zygocki, Chevron’s Vice President of Policy, Government, 
and Public Affairs). 
 4. See It’s Time Oil Companies Get Behind the Development of Renewable Energy, 
CHEVRON CORP., http://www.chevron.com/weagree/?statement=renewables (last visited Sept. 
5, 2011) (affirming Chevron’s long term commitment to renewable energy sources) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). Another ad, 
agreeing that “oil companies need to get real,” offers somewhat of a counterpoint, stating that 
fossil fuels “are the lifeblood of any modern economy,” that “no other form of energy is as 
economical, as plentiful, or as reliable,” and therefore that oil must play a continuing role in 
meeting the world’s energy demands. See id. (quoting Paul Siegele, President of Chevron 
Energy Technology). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1953329




 Still another admits that the company makes considerable profits but 
argues that it puts those profits “to good use,” reinvesting them in future 
energy supplies, employing workers at good wages, paying billions in 
taxes, helping communities and small businesses, and distributing profits to 
shareholders “who rely on [Chevron] dividends.”
6
 And a final 
advertisement “agrees [that] oil companies should support the communities 
they’re part of.”
7
 When it partners with a country, Chevron continues, it 
“commits for the long term,” and although Chevron does not claim to 
“replace the role of government,” it strives to “make a difference” where it 
operates, particularly in the areas of “health, education, and welfare.”
8
   
Much of the “we agree” campaign echoes what the company terms 
“The Chevron Way: Getting Results the Right Way.” According to the 
company website, “Chevron Way” values include the following: 
 
We conduct our business in a socially responsible and ethical manner. 
We respect the law, support universal human rights, protect the 
environment and benefit the communities where we work . . . . Integrity. 
We are honest with others and ourselves . . . . We accept responsibility 
and hold ourselves accountable for our work and our actions . . . . 
Protecting People and the Environment. We place the highest priority 





While Chevron’s website is replete with impressive testimonials,
10
 the “we 
agree” campaign, and particularly statements like these last few, rankled 
some.
11
  So much so that a rogue series of “we agree” advertisements soon 
                                                                                                                                      
 5.  See Oil Companies Should Think More Like Technology Companies, CHEVRON 
CORP., http://www.chevron.com/weagree/?statement=technology (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) 
(quoting John W. McDonald, Chevron’s Vice President and Chief Technology Officer) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 6.  See Oil Companies Should Put Their Profits to Good Use, CHEVRON CORP., 
http://www.chevron.com/weagree/?statement=growth (last visited Sept 5, 2011) (quoting 
Patricia E. Yarrington, Chevron’s Vice President and Chief Financial Officer) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the  Environment). 
 7. See Oil Companies Should Support the Communities They’re A Part Of, CHEVRON 
CORP., http://www.chevron.com/weagree/?statement=community (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) 
(quoting Rhonda Zygocki) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, 
and the Environment). 
 8.  See id. (describing Chevron’s positive impacts in partner countries).   
 9. The Chevron Way, CHEVRON CORP., http://www.chevron.com/about/chevronway 
(last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, 
and the Environment). 
 10. See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text. 
 11. See Adam Werbach, The Failure of Chevron’s New “We Agree” Ad Campaign, THE 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 21, 2010 4:50 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/10/the-
failure-of-chevrons-new-we-agree-ad-campaign/64951/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (stating that 
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emerged, spoofing Chevron’s campaign so well that some news outlets 
believed them authentic.
12
 Not surprisingly, the spoofs went further than 
Chevron’s own platitudes, “agreeing” that “oil companies should clean up 
their own messes,” “fix the problems they create,” “put safety first,” and 
“stop endangering life.”
13
 One fake advertisement read:  
 
Extracting oil from the Earth is a risky process, and mistakes do happen. 
It’s easy to pass the blame or ignore the mistakes we’ve made. Instead, 
we need to face them head on, accept our financial and environmental 





                                                                                                                                      
many of Chevron’s “good works . . . were required by law”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 12. See David Zax, Chevron’s New Ad Campaign is a Slick Yes Men Hoax, FAST 
COMPANY (Oct. 18, 2010), http://www.fastcompany.com/1695892/chevrons-new-ad-
campaign-makes-lemonade (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (“In retrospect, it does seem ridiculous 
that any oil company would take such aggressive responsibility for oil spills, poor industry 
safety, and exploitation of foreign resources.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Energy, Climate, and the Environment); see also Rupal Parekh & Michael Bush, Pranksters 
Hijack Chevron Corporate-PR Efforts: What Do Marketers Do When Faced with Ads, Fake 
Press Releases, Fake News Stories?, ADVERTISING AGE (October 18, 2010), 
http://adage.com/print/146559 (last visited September 8, 2011) (explaining that some media 
outlets had difficulty determining real ads from fake ones) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment); Stuart Elliott, Pranksters Lampoon 
Chevron Ad Campaign, N.Y. TIMES MEDIA DECODER BLOG (Oct. 18, 2010), 
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/18/pranksters-lampoon-chevron-ad-campaign/ 
(describing the spoofed ads and noting fooled news outlets) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  
 13.  See Chevron—We Agree, RAINFOREST ACTION NETWORK ET AL., 
http://www.chevron-weagree.com (last visited Sept. 19, 2011) (displaying realistic but false 
advertisements parodying Chevron’s “we agree” campaign) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). More parodies of the “we agree” 
campaign followed, including a fake ad contest and viral videos with lines like the following: 
Chevron executive, trying to understand the new ad campaign: “We say ‘we agree’ but we 
don’t actually have to do anything?” Ad executive: “We are going to make pretending to care 
the new caring.” Punk Chevron Video Contest, CHEVRONTHINKSWE’RESTUPID.ORG, 
http://chevronthinkswerestupid.org/videogallery (last visited September 20, 2011) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment); see also 
ChevronToxico: The Campaign for Justice in Equador, CHEVRONTOXICO, 
http://chevrontoxico.com (last visited September 20, 2011) (promoting awareness about 
Chevron’s lawsuit in Ecuador) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, 
Climate, and the Environment); We Can Change Chevron, Energy Shouldn’t Cost Lives, 
RAINFOREST ACTION NETWORK, http://changechevron.org (last visited September 20, 2011) 
(attempting to pressure Chevron into taking responsibility for the environmental damage in 
Ecuador and elsewhere) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and 
the Environment).   
 14.  We Punked Chevron, CHEVRONTHINKSWE’RESTUPID, 
http://chevronthinkswerestupid.org/weagree (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
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What would trigger such a response? The answer lies in Chevron’s 
other current public-relations effort: disclaiming responsibility for 
environmental damage to the Amazon Rainforest in Ecuador.
15
 There, the 
company is defending against a lawsuit seeking billions of dollars for 
“environmental remediation, excess cancer deaths, impacts on indigenous 
cultures, and unjust enrichment” stemming from Texaco’s activities there 
between 1964 and 1992.
16
 All told, the company is said to have “dump[ed] 
an estimated 18 billion[] gallons of toxic wastewater into [Ecuadorean] 
rivers and streams and spill[ed] roughly 17 million gallons of crude oil into 
the ancestral territory of six indigenous tribes.”
17
 Chevron acquired Texaco, 
assuming its legal obligations, in 2001.
18
   
The Ecuadorean plaintiffs originally brought suit in the United States 
against Texaco in 1993, but the oil company successfully moved to dismiss 
the case for forum non conveniens, leaving plaintiffs to litigate their claims, 
if at all, back in Ecuador.
19
 Plaintiffs refiled their suit in Ecuador against 
Chevron as Texaco’s successor in 2003
20
 and won a staggering $18 billion 
judgment on February 14, 2011,
21
 which Chevron is now appealing.
22
 
                                                                                                                                      
 15.  See Elliott, supra note 12 (“The spoof is a direct consequence of Chevron’s trying to 
fool people into thinking it is environmentally conscious when the company is responsible for 
the extensive contamination found in Ecuador’s rain forest . . . .” (quoting a spokesperson for 
the Ecuadorean plaintiffs)).  
 16.  See CRUDE (Entendre Films 2009) (documenting the ongoing suit against Chevron 
for oil pollution in Ecuador). 
 17.  See Mitch Anderson, Chevron Adds Insult to Injury in the Amazon, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRONICLE CITY BRIGHTS BLOG (Feb. 7, 2011), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/blogs/manderson/detail?entry_id=82541 (detailing the extent of the environmental damage) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).   
 18.  See In re Chevron Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d 141, 143 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting 
Chevron’s acquisition of Texaco). As a general rule, following a merger, a target’s liabilities 
become the acquiror’s. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit., 8 § 259(a) (2010) (providing that a 
target’s liabilities following a merger “attach to [the] surviving corporation[] and may be 
enforced against it to the same extent as if said . . . liabilities . . . had been incurred or 
contracted by it”). 
 19. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing 
the case), aff’d, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 384, 
396 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting Texaco’s “promise[] that . . . it would ‘satisfy judgments that might 
be entered in plaintiffs’ favor . . . subject to [its] rights under New York’s Recognition of 
Foreign Country Money Judgments Act [dealing with fraud and due process]” (quoting an 
earlier Texaco memorandum of law)). 
 20. See In re Chevron Corp., 749 F.Supp.2d at 143 (“Chevron is the target of litigation 
brought in Ecuador by the so-called Lago Agrio plaintiffs in which the latter seek to recover 
$113 billion for alleged environmental pollution by Texaco, Inc., from Texaco’s current 
owner, Chevron Corporation.”). The film CRUDE, cited supra note 16, documents the lawsuit 
in Ecuador and includes scenes where the court holds hearings in the field and hears arguments 
from the lawyers just steps from oil-contaminated sites.  
 21. See Felicity Carus, Chevron Chiefs Face Shareholders After Huge $18bn Ecuador 
Fine, THE GUARDIAN (May 25, 2011), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/may/25/chevron-heads-shareholders-huge-fine 
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Chevron’s position in the case is quite simple: whatever harm Texaco 
wrought in Ecuador was done as part of a consortium with Ecuador’s 
national oil company Petroecuador, and when Texaco withdrew from the 
consortium in the 1990s, the Ecuadorean government released it from any 
further environmental responsibility upon the completion of certain 
remediation efforts.
23
 These were completed to the Ecuadorean 
government’s satisfaction by 1998,
24
 and Chevron claims the resulting 
release bars plaintiffs’ claims.
25
 Plaintiffs respond that the release covers 
                                                                                                                                      
(breaking the judgment down as follows: $8.6 billion for environmental remediation, $860,000 
to the named plaintiffs, and $8.6 billion in punitive damages) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 22. See id. (noting Chevron’s appeal efforts).     
 23.  See Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 376 F. Supp. 2d 334, 342 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (describing Ecuador and Texaco’s 1995 contract).   
 24.  See Texaco Petroleum, Ecuador and the Lawsuit Against Chevron, CHEVRON CORP.,  
www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/texacopetroleumecuadorlawsuit.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 
2011) [hereinafter Texaco Petroleum] (noting Texaco’s remediation to the Ecuadorean 
government’s satisfaction and the government’s subsequent release of Texaco from any 
remaining environmental liability) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, 
Climate, and the Environment). Plaintiffs dispute whether Chevron adequately fulfilled these 
obligations. See, e.g., Steven Donziger, The Chevron Way, FORBES (Sept. 16, 2009), 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/09/16/chevron-texaco-crude-amazon-ecuador-opinions-
contributors-steven-donziger.html (conveying the position of plaintiffs’ lawyer, Stephen 
Donziger, that “[e]vidence at trial submitted by the plaintiffs demonstrates that Texaco’s 
purported clean-up ignored the contaminated groundwater, rivers and streams, and consisted 
primarily of dumping dirt over waste pits without adequately cleaning out the toxins”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 25.  See Michael D. Goldhaber, Forum Shopper’s Remorse, CORPORATE COUNSEL (Apr. 
1, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202445653516 (“Chevron says[] 
Texaco abated the problem with a $40 million cleanup after it left the country, for which it 
obtained a (much disputed) release from liability.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). Chevron also claims that the plaintiffs’ 
lawyers have improperly influenced the Ecuadorean courts, manufactured and falsified 
evidence, and are generally trying to defraud and extort Chevron in the Ecuador litigation. See 
Lawrence Hurley, Chevron Wins Restraining Order in $113B Pollution Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
9, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/02/09/09greenwire-chevron-wins-restraining-
order-in-113b-polluti-20818.html (discussing Chevron’s accusations) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). Chevron has also 
obtained injunctive relief before the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague under United 
Nations trade law, arguing that Ecuador’s court system cannot fairly and independently hear 
the case against it. See Michael D. Goldhaber, Arbitrators Order Ecuador to Suspend 
Enforcement of Any Judgment Against Chevron, AMERICAN LAWYER (Feb. 10, 2011, 10:51 
PM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2011/02/chevron021111.html (noting the 
decision and Chevron’s accusations of fraud by plaintiffs’ lawyers) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). This is somewhat 
ironic given the company’s earlier effort to have the case heard in Ecuador. See Goldhaber, 
Forum Shopper’s Remorse, supra; see also Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing the case), aff’d, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002) (granting Chevron’s 
motion for forum non conveniens in the United States). A federal court in New York recently 
entered a similar order, which is now on appeal in the Second Circuit. See Chevron Corp. v. 
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only governmental claims for environmental liability, not citizen-plaintiffs’ 




Whatever the merits of the Ecuadorean action,
27
 Chevron’s critics cry 
hypocrisy: “Chevron’s rhetoric and the public image that they put forward 
[are] very different from how they’re actually operating.”
28
 While the 
company claims to care about the communities in which it operates, and 
particularly local health and welfare, its Ecuadorean track record and 
litigation position belie its public statements.
29
 While the company claims 
to prioritize the environment and accept responsibility for its actions, it 
disclaims any obligation for the oil pollution its predecessor created that 
continues to seep into water sources and, it is argued, severely impact 
residents’ health.
30
 And while the company purports to put its considerable 
profits to “good use,” those uses apparently include lobbying efforts to 
repeal climate-change legislation,
31
 multinational litigation to evade 
environmental responsibility, and superficial ad campaigns meant to 




                                                                                                                                      
Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (preventing the Ecuadorean plaintiffs 
from immediately enforcing any Ecuadorean judgment against the company’s United States 
assets); see also Mark Hamblett, Attorneys Spar Over Impact of Injunction in Chevron Case, 
N.Y. L.J., May 11, 2011, http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202493524878 
(reporting on the Second Circuit oral argument) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal 
of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 26. See Goldhaber, Forum Shopper’s Remorse, supra note 25 (relating plaintiffs’ 
argument).   
 27. For more on the Ecuador lawsuit and related issues, see generally Chris Jochnick & 
Nina Rabaeus, Business and Human Rights Revitalized: A New U.N. Framework Meets Texaco 
in the Amazon, 33 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 413 (2010); Cortelyou Kenney, Disaster in the 
Amazon: Dodging “Boomerang Suits” in Transnational Human Rights Litigation, 97 CALIF. L. 
REV. 857 (2009); Judith Kimerling, Indigenous Peoples and the Oil Frontier in Amazonia: The 
Case of Ecuador, ChevronTexaco, and Aguinda v. Texaco, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 413 
(2006); Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. 
L. REV. 1081 (2010). 
 28. See Casselman, supra note 1, at B10 (discussing criticism of Chevron’s new ad 
campaign); see also Elliott, supra note 12 (“Chevron’s trying to fool people into thinking it is 
environmentally conscious when the company is responsible for extensive contamination found 
in Ecuador’s rain forest and in other places as well.” (quoting a spokesperson for the 
Ecuadorean plaintiffs)). 
 29. See Casselman, supra note 1, at B10 (contrasting Chevron’s “we agree” campaign 
with Chevron’s corporate practices). 
 30. See Texaco Petroleum, supra note 24 (summarizing the company’s litigation 
position). 
 31. See Casselman, supra note 1, at B10 (noting Chevron’s efforts to repeal a 2006 
Californian climate-change law). 
 32. See Steven Mufson, Critics Spoof New Chevron Ads Promoting Responsibility, 
WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 20, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/10/19/AR2010101904622.html (“When it comes to oil spills, climate 
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In an earlier article, we examined a similar “green” advertising 
campaign from another major oil company mired in an environmental 
catastrophe.
33
 There, in the context of the BP oil spill, we explored what it 
means to be a socially responsible corporation, noted consumer and 
investor preferences for socially responsible behavior and goods and 
services, and recognized a temptation for firms to appear to be more 
socially responsible than they in fact are.
34
 We termed misleading corporate 
social responsibility claims “faux CSR” and discussed various ways in 
which the legal system could police this sort of corporate greenwashing.
35
   
We draw on that framework here to determine whether the legal 
theories we advanced in the previous article could provide redress to 
consumers or investors misled by Chevron’s CSR claims.
36
 This Article 
proceeds in two parts. In Part II, we offer some background on 
greenwashing and CSR and set out the framework we established in the 
earlier article for approaching faux CSR.
37
 In Part III, we apply this 
framework to Chevron’s “we agree” campaign, gauge whether misled 
consumers and investors might have a legal remedy as a result of Chevron’s 
advertising claims, and refine the alternatives we developed to better 
regulate corporate greenwashing.
38
   
 
II.  A Framework for Policing Greenwashing 
 
American environmentalist Jay Westerveld coined the term 
“greenwashing” in 1986 in response to a hotel’s efforts to encourage guests 
                                                                                                                                      
change and human rights abuses, we need real action from Chevron. Instead we get this high-
cost glossy ad campaign.”) (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and 
the Environment); see also Casselman, supra note 1, at B10 (estimating the cost of the “we 
agree” campaign at more than $90 million).   
 33. See Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit: Rethinking Corporate 
Social Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 85 TUL. L. REV. 983, 1002–
09 (2011) (analyzing corporate social responsibility and greenwashing in the context of the BP 
oil spill). 
 34. See id. 
 35. See id. 
 36. We do not address securities-fraud claims that Chevron misled its shareholders about 
the severity of the risks to the company from the Ecuadorean litigation. For such an analysis, 
see Simon Billenness & Sanford Lewis, An Analysis of the Financial and Operational Risks to 
Chevron Corporation from Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco, AMAZON WATCH 1, 1–17 (May 11, 
2011) http://chevrontoxico.com/assets/docs/Chevron-
Ecuador_Risk_Analysis_Report_May2011.pdf.   
 37. See infra Part II (discussing origins of “greenwashing” and potential legal 
implications). 
 38. See infra Part III (proposing ways to police “greenwashing” and faux CSR more 
effectively). 
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to help the environment by reusing towels.
39
 While the hotel’s stated 
purpose was to reduce water, energy, and detergent use, Westerveld 
suspected its true motivation was profit.
40
 A play on “whitewashing”—
using white paint to cover over dirt in a superficial or transparent way—the 
term “greenwashing” soon came to signify insincere, dubious, inflated, or 
misleading environmental claims.
41
 Various environmental groups have 
similarly objected to the current widespread use of the word “green” for 
products and services that do not truly or meaningfully benefit the 
environment.
42
 Indeed, it seems that many products, services, and 
companies now boast some shade of “green”—even companies in “dirty” 




By contrast, many companies genuinely engage in corporate social 
responsibility (or CSR).
44
 These firms strive to create returns for their 
shareholders, good products and services for their customers, good jobs and 
wages for their employees and communities, and benefit the public by 
treading lightly on (or even improving) the natural environment.
45
 In 
serving all of these corporate constituencies, and taking a broad view of the 
firm’s best interests, a company often benefits financially.
46
 Studies have 
                                                                                                                                      
 39. See Alice Rawsthorn, The Toxic Side of Being, Literally, Green, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/05/arts/05iht-
design5.html?scp=1&sq=the%20toxic%20side%20of%20being%20literally%20green&st=cse 
(crediting Westerveld with coining the term “greenwashing”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 40. See id. 
 41. See id. (“These days [greenwashing] refers to anyone who makes fake environmental 
claims.”). 
 42. Cf. Tom Wright, False “Green” Ads Draw Global Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 
2008, at B4, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120163622342426091.html 
(discussing the difficulties of policing inaccurate “green” ads). Today many of these 
environmental groups receive corporate support and have shied away from such accusations; 
the more radical environmental groups including Greenpeace continue their criticism unabated. 
See, e.g., John Vidal, Artists Prepare for BP Protest at Tate Britain, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), 
June 25, 2010, 2010 WLNR 12736937 (interviewing groups protesting BP’s “cuddly” 
manufactured corporate persona). 
 43. See Beate Sjåfjell, Regulating Companies as if the World Matters: Reflections from 
the Ongoing Sustainable Companies Project, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) 
(remarking that “the ugliest companies wear the most makeup”); see also Carol Elliott, ND 
Management Professor Earns “Best Paper” Award for Greenwashing Research, UNIVERSITY 
OF NOTRE DAME MENDOZA SCHOOL OF BUSINESS (Nov. 22, 2010), available at 
http://business.nd.edu/faculty_and_research/article.aspx?id=8012 (describing Sarv Devaraj & 
Suvrat Dhanorkar, Do As I Say Not As I Do: An Empirical Examination of the Relationship 
Between Corporate Sustainability Beliefs and Performance, which found a negative correlation 
between CSR rhetoric and environmental performance).  
 44. See Cherry & Sneirson, supra note 33, at 1013 n.160 (listing examples of genuine 
CSR). 
 45. See id. at 1010–14 (describing ways in which corporations engage in CSR). 
 46. See id. at 1013–14 (noting the correlation between profitability and CSR). 
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shown that CSR tends to break even and frequently turns a profit,
47
 which 
comports with one’s general sense that consumers are willing to pay more 




Several legal scholars have noted the problems that arise from 
greenwashing and other forms of faux CSR.
49
 Driven to maximize short-
term profits,
50
 companies have an incentive to promise consumers “eco-
friendly” products but deliver goods or services in the cheapest way 
possible, regardless of environmental impact.
51
 While this description may 
seem extreme or blatant, there is an unfortunately strong incentive to renege 
on advertising promises to uncertain constituencies outside the company, 
like the environment.
52
 Indeed, because of these issues, some commentators 
have called for more disclosure of the true state of corporate environmental 
records and for the creation of a remedy for fraudulent or misleading CSR 
claims.
53
   
Professor Cynthia Williams began this effort approximately ten years 
ago, arguing in the Harvard Law Review that the SEC should require 
publicly-traded companies to make accurate and standardized disclosures of 
their social and environmental performance.
54
 More recently, Professor 
Michael Siebecker agreed but noted that false CSR advertising, 
commercials, and social responsibility reports might easily mislead 
                                                                                                                                      
 47. See id. at 1013 (citing various studies); see also Michael C. Jensen, Value 
Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 22 J. OF APPLIED 
CORP. FIN. 32, 32–41 (2001) (positing that a firm best maximizes its long-term value by tending 
to all of its stakeholder groups). 
 48. See Cherry & Sneirson, supra note 33, at 1002–03 (noting consumer willingness to 
pay more for socially responsible goods and services).  
 49. See id. at 1026–27 (citing scholarship). 
 50. See Judd F. Sneirson, Shareholder Profits and the Sustainable Corporation, 46 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 541, 556 (2011) [hereinafter Sneirson, Shareholder Profits] (identifying 
the market forces that encourage corporate managers to focus on short-term stock price). 
 51. See Cherry & Sneirson, supra note 33, at 1026–28 (discussing incentives to produce 
short-term profits). 
 52. See id. at 1026–28 (noting these incentives). 
 53. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, The SEC and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1293–1306 (1999) (proposing that SEC mandate disclosure of 
environmental information, thus providing a check against inflated advertising claims); 
Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an Institutional Approach 
to the First Amendment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613, 618–19 (2006) (suggesting that First 
Amendment jurisprudence does not protect misleading corporate political speech from 
mandatory disclosure securities laws); Janet E. Kerr, The Creative Capitalism Spectrum: 
Evaluating CSR Through a Legal Lens, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 831, 834–42 (2008) [hereinafter 
Kerr, Creative Capitalism] (contemplating corporate liability for “greenwashing” under Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act). 
 54. See Williams, supra note 53, at 1293–1306 (proposing that the SEC mandate 
disclosure of environmental information, thus providing a check against inflated advertising 
claims). 




 And two years ago, Professor Janet Kerr began sketching the 
preliminary contours of what an action under Rule 10b-5 for misleading or 
faux CSR might look like.
56
 
 In our previous article, we criticized BP as a “free rider” on the CSR 
efforts of other firms and argued that BP undeservingly enjoyed the 
public’s goodwill toward companies involved in socially responsible 
practices.
57
 The gap that BP so effectively exploited—taking advantage of 
the public relations upside of CSR without actually expending the time or 
money to integrate or engage in it—is particularly troublesome in that it 
might ultimately erode the positive sentiment enjoyed by companies 
actually engaged in meaningful CSR.
58
 We then suggested a number of 
avenues for policing greenwashing and faux CSR, which we revisit here: 
remedies under false advertising laws; claims under the securities-fraud 
laws; the newly established Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 
which could play a major role in policing CSR claims; and private standard-
setting by independent organizations or other groups.
59
 We review their 
basic elements below and in Part III apply them to Chevron’s “we agree” 
campaign. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
 55. See Siebecker, supra note 53, at 618–19 (suggesting that First Amendment 
jurisprudence does not protect misleading corporate political speech from mandatory disclosure 
securities laws). 
 56. See Kerr, Creative Capitalism, supra note 53, at 839–42 (applying Rule 10b–5 to 
materially misleading CSR statements). Some of Professor Kerr’s other proposals are far more 
radical. For example, in a 2009 article, she argues that the government might want to choose to 
mandate CSR in some instances, for example, when a multinational corporation engages in 
various functions in a third-world country that make it more akin to a government than a 
corporation. See Janet E. Kerr, A New Era of Responsibility: A Modern American Mandate for 
CSR, 78 UMKC L. REV. 327, 333–34 (2009) (arguing that Congress has the authority to set 
corporate social responsibilities under the Commerce Clause); see also David Monsma & John 
Buckley, Non-Financial Corporate Performance: The Material Edges of Social and 
Environmental Disclosure, 11 U. BALT. J. ENVT’L L. 151, 182–93 (2004) (arguing that 
corporate statements about the extent of their CSR programs could in some instances be 
material). Others have noted that corporate “codes of ethics” could also potentially be subject 
to liability as a form of false advertising if the company’s executives fail to comply with the 
codes. See Su-Ping Lu, Corporate Codes of Conduct and the FTC: Advancing Human Rights 
Through Deceptive Advertising Law, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 603, 619–28 (2000) 
(discussing the elements necessary to enforce corporate conduct through the FTC). 
 57. See Cherry & Sneirson, supra note 33, at 1036 (arguing that BP benefited from other 
companies’ genuine CSR by advertising their faux CSR). 
 58. See id. at 1026–27 (citing Professors Williams, Siebecker, and Kerr’s articles on 
CSR and greenwashing). 
 59. See id. at 1025–35 (discussing possible legal claims against companies employing 
faux CSR). 
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A.  False Advertising 
 
To allege a claim for unfair trade practices, false advertising, or 
consumer fraud, one must typically show a representation, omission, or 
practice that is likely to mislead or deceive potential consumers; the 
representation, omission, or practice must be material, meaning it is likely 
to affect consumers’ buying decisions; and the representation, omission, or 
practice must cause consumers some injury.
60
 
There are few such reported cases dealing with corporate claims of 
social responsibility, and those that have been brought typically concern 
specific product labeling asserting the product is “green.”
61
 For example, 
successful claims have been made as against insecticide companies who 
labeled their products as safe or environmentally friendly when that was not 
the case.
62
 Cases have also been brought challenging the use of the word 
“recycled,” “recyclable,” or “biodegradable,” which all now have strict 
legal definitions.
63
 Although these cases dealt with false representation 
claims concerning product labeling, a false advertising case around an 
environmental claim could be seen as analogous.  
Perhaps the most prominent case involving greenwashing and faux 
CSR is Kasky v. Nike.
64
 There, activist plaintiffs brought an action under 
California’s false advertising law against Nike for making assertions about 
its labor practices, which action the lower courts summarily dismissed on 
free-speech grounds.
65
 Holding that Nike’s assertions were commercial 
speech and thus subject to a lower level of constitutional protection, the 
California Supreme Court remanded the case for further factual findings to 
                                                                                                                                      
 60.  See IQ Prods. Co. v. Pennzoil Prods. Co., 305 F.3d 368, 370 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(interpreting section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2006), which 
regulates false or misleading descriptions of fact in connection with commerce of goods and 
services); see also Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247 (Cal. 2002) (analyzing Nike’s 
statements about its labor practices under California law), cert. granted, 539 U.S. 654 (2003).  
Many states provide similar protections.  See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (West 2001 & 
Supp. 2011) (regulating consumer fraud); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (2009) (regulating 
unfair trade practices). 
 61. See Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance “Reform” and the New Corporate 
Social Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605, 646 (2001) (identifying specific claims against 
green labeling). 
 62. See id. (referencing cases involving misleading environmental advertising claims); 
see also John M. Church, A Market Solution to Green Marketing: Some Lessons from the 
Economics of Information, 79 MINN. L. REV. 245, 301–04 (1994) (same). 
 63. See 16 C.F.R. Part 260 (2011) (setting forth the Federal Trade Commission’s “Green 
Guides” for the use of environmental labels in marketing); Church, supra note 62, at 305–06 
(referring to cases involving terms such as “degradable,” “biodegradable,” “environmentally 
safe,” and “ozone friendly”).  
 64. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert. granted, 539 U.S. 654 (2003). 
 65. See id. at 249 (summarizing the case’s procedural history). 
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see if Nike’s statements were, indeed, false.
66
 The California Supreme 
Court stated: 
 
Our holding, based on decisions of the United States Supreme Court, in 
no way prohibits any business enterprise from speaking out on issues of 
public importance or from vigorously defending its own labor practices. 
It means only that when a business enterprise, to promote and defend its 
sales and profits, makes factual representations about its own products 




The case eventually settled out of court with Nike promising to fix 
various labor issues, subject itself to third-party monitoring, and make a 
monetary payment to a worker’s advocacy non-profit group.
68
 While many 
commentators have lauded Kasky v. Nike as a promising avenue to keep 
corporations to their word regarding worker rights,
69
 the result is more 
tantalizing than fulfilling, as the Supreme Court of the United States never 
ruled on the issue. 
That said, the issue likely remains an open one: if “green” claims were 
a significant part of a company’s consumer marketing and consumers did, 
in fact, rely on false statements, the corporation’s claims would not be 
entitled to an absolute First Amendment free-speech defense.
70
 Instead, 
such statements would only be accorded the (lesser) deference afforded to 
commercial speech.
71
 State governments may regulate commercial speech 
that is false or misleading,
72
 and consumer reliance on false green 
advertising could form the basis of private actions for false advertising and 
consumer fraud.
73
 Thus, if consumers could show that they purchased 
gasoline or other goods and services on the basis of green advertising 
                                                                                                                                      
 66. See id. at 262 (not deciding whether Nike’s speech was false or misleading). 
 67. Id. at 247. 
 68. See Adam Liptak, Nike Move Ends Case Over Firms’ Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 13, 2003, at A8 (discussing how Nike’s settlement ended what was expected to be a 
landmark ruling on free speech). 
 69. For a sampling of commentary about Kasky v. Nike, see generally Robert L. Kerr, 
From Sullivan to Nike: Will the Noble Purpose of the Landmark Free Speech Case Be 
Subverted to Immunize False Advertising, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 525 (2004); Tamara R. Piety, 
Grounding Nike: Exposing Nike’s Quest for a Constitutional Right to Lie, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 
151 (2005); Michele Sutton, Between a Rock and a Judicial Hard Place: Corporate Social 
Responsibility Reporting and Potential Legal Liability Under Kasky v. Nike, 72 UMKC L. 
REV. 1159 (2004); Samuel A. Terilli, Nike v. Kasky and the Running-But-Going-Nowhere 
Commercial Speech Debate, 10 COMM. L. & POL’Y 383 (2005); David C. Vladeck, Lessons 
from a Story Untold: Nike v. Kasky Reconsidered, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1049 (2004). 
 70. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247–49 (Cal. 2002) (concluding Nike’s 
statements are commercial speech). 
 71.  See id. at 247. 
 72. See id. (noting permissible limitations on commercial speech). 
 73. See supra notes 39–59 and accompanying text (discussing the background of 
greenwashing and faux CSR). 
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claims that turned out not to be true, they would be entitled to recover the 
amount that they paid as compared to prices for similar goods and services, 
together with any other damages as provided in the relevant statutes. 
 
B.  Securities Fraud 
 





 for securities fraud. Rule 10b-5 requires that a plaintiff 
show a material misstatement or actionable omission of fact, made with 
scienter, on which another justifiably relies, causing damages.
76
  Securities 
fraud additionally requires that the fraud be “in connection with the 
purchase or sale of a security” per the statute;
77
 if the security is traded on 
an efficient market such as the New York Stock Exchange, reliance can be 
presumed under the “fraud on the market theory”;
78
 and, regarding 
causation, the plaintiff must show both that the misstatement or omission 
caused the purchase or sale (transaction causation) and that the 
misstatement or omission caused the complained-of loss (loss causation).
79
 
A recent Sixth Circuit case highlights a difficult obstacle for faux CSR 
claims alleging securities fraud: materiality.
80
 There, shareholders sued the 
Ford Motor Company alleging securities fraud in connection with the 
company’s statements regarding the safety of the Ford Explorer’s tires.
81
 
Plaintiffs noted that they were in part suing Ford for calling itself a 
“socially responsible company” while simultaneously marketing products 
that were dangerous.
82
 The court was not moved by Ford’s claim that it was 
“a leader in corporate social responsibility”:  
 
Such statements are either mere corporate puffery or hyperbole that a 
reasonable investor would not view as significantly changing the 
general gist of available information, and thus, are not material, even if 
they were misleading. All public companies praise their products and 
                                                                                                                                      
 74. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j–2 (2010) (prohibiting 
securities fraud). 
 75. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2011) (prohibiting securities fraud). 
 76. Compare WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS 
§ 105 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) (listing the elements of common-law fraud), 
with Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (listing the elements of securities 
fraud), and Dura Pharm. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (same). 
 77. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
 78. See Basic, Inc., 485 U.S. at 241–48 (endorsing the fraud-on-the-market theory). 
 79. See Dura Pharm., Inc., 544 U.S. at 341–42 (distinguishing between transaction 
causation and loss causation and requiring both). 
 80. See In re Ford Motor Co., 381 F.3d 563, 570–71 (6th Cir. 2004) (analyzing whether 
Ford’s statements were material); see also Monsma & Buckley, supra note 56, at 115 
(discussing materiality); Kerr, Creative Capitalism, supra note 53, at 857 (same). 
 81. See In re Ford Motor Co., 381 F.3d at 570–71 (relating plaintiffs’ allegations). 
 82. Id. at 569. 
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their objectives. Courts everywhere “have demonstrated a willingness to 
find immaterial as a matter of law a certain kind of rosy affirmation 
commonly heard from corporate managers and numbingly familiar to 
the marketplace—loosely optimistic statements that are so vague, so 
lacking in specificity, or so clearly constituting the opinions of the 
speaker, that no reasonable investor could find them important to the 




Thus, even if a faux CSR challenge can successfully point to a company’s 
false statement, that statement might be immaterial as a matter of law on the 
ground that it is just meaningless hyperbolic puffery.
84
 
We suggested in our earlier article that this materiality hurdle might be 
overcome on appropriate facts.
85
 We noted that, as socially conscious 
investing continues to increase in volume and popularity,
86
 “a large 
institutional investor or a class of socially responsible mutual funds may 
have a more objective basis for relying on non-financial company 
statements, policies and practices.”
87
 These sorts of funds explicitly make 
investment decisions based on more than just financial performance and 
place credence on statements about a company’s social and environmental 
activities.
88
 It would be wrong to say that CSR would be immaterial to such 
an investment decision, notwithstanding the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in the 
quoted passage. 
A second, smaller hurdle for faux CSR securities fraud claims involves 
causation. As noted above, a plaintiff in a securities fraud action must prove 
both that the misstatement caused the plaintiffs to purchase or sell the 
company’s security and that the misstatement of fact relates to the 
complained-of loss.
89
 As applied to BP or Chevron, this means that an 
investor was motivated to buy or sell their stock on the basis of the 
companies’ environmental platitudes. Such a plaintiff would also have to 
                                                                                                                                      
 83. Id. at 570–71 (quoting Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1217 (1st Cir. 
1996)). On puffery generally, see David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA 
L. REV. 1395 (2006). 
 84. See Hoffman, supra note 83, at 1407 (noting a Fourth Circuit determination that a 
company’s statement about future earnings was immaterial puffery). 
 85. See Cherry & Sneirson, supra note 33, at 1032 (discussing how, as socially 
conscious investing increases, the materiality hurdle may not seem insurmountable). 
 86. See generally George Djurasovic, The Regulation of Socially Responsible Mutual 
Funds, 22 J. CORP. L. 257 (1997) (noting the increasing popularity of socially conscious 
investing). 
 87. See Monsma & Buckley, supra note 56, at 189 (discussing how a company’s non-
financial commitments can create investor expectations). 
 88. See id. at 169 (noting that investment firms assess environmental performance and 
overall corporate responsibility). 
 89. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (noting the transaction and loss causation 
requirements). 
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show loss causation, that BP’s or Chevron’s stock price subsequently fell 
because it did not live up to its environmental claims.  
 
C.  Dodd-Frank  
 
A third possibility for policing CSR claims may be on the horizon.  In 
July of 2010, Congress enacted a number of historic financial reforms as 
part of the Dodd-Frank Act.
90
 Section 1011 of the Act enables the 
establishment of a Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection to “regulate 
the offering and provision of consumer financial products or services under 
the Federal consumer financial laws.”
91
 The statutory language concerning 
consumer education, appropriate disclosure, and tracking of consumer 
complaints
92
 could overlap with faux CSR and greenwashing, as these are 
consumer-information issues and accurate disclosure could certainly 
influence consumers’ informed investment decisions. Further, educating 
consumers about their rights should include helping consumers understand 
whether their purchases will advance the causes they believe in. That can 
only be done through accurate disclosure. As the legislation and the Bureau 
are still so new, it is difficult to know how the various provisions will be 
enforced and what litigation they will generate. That said, it is intriguing to 
think about the possibility that the new agency might include accurate 





D.  Certifications 
 
A fourth means of policing corporate claims of social responsibility 
draws on certifications. Many public and private certifications currently 
exist, verifying that foods are organic or kosher,
94
 that products are fairly 
                                                                                                                                      
 90. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–
203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010). 
 91. Id. § 1011. 
 92. See id. §§ 1031–37 (delineating the actions the Bureau may take against unfair, 
deceptive, or abusive acts or practices). 
 93. See generally Cherry & Sneirson, supra note 33, at 1034. 
 94. See National Organic Program, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., 
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/nop (last visited Sept. 7, 2011)  (describing the regulations 
and process for certifying USDA organic products) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment); see also Certification Services, QUALITY 
ASSURANCE INT’L, http://www.qai-inc.com/services/certification_services.asp (last visited Sept. 
7, 2011) (explaining QAI’s certification programs) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment); Overview of Oregon Tilth, OR. TILTH, 
http://tilth.org/about (last visited Sept. 7, 2011) (describing the nonprofit organization’s goal of 
supporting socially equitable agriculture through certification) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment); OUKosher.Org: The World’s Most 
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traded or meet certain qualities,
95
 that buildings meet certain “green” 
standards,
96
 that wood and paper products are sustainably harvested,
97
 and 
that companies adhere to environmental and social-responsibility 
standards.
98
 Certifying organizations typically license their marks to those 
who meet their standards, permitting them to display the marks on products 




These and other marks can be used to verify corporations’ social-
responsibility claims for consumers and investors.
100
 B Labs, the owner of 
the “B Corporation” mark, already offers something similar, certifying and 
licensing corporations that adhere to its standards of environmental and 
social benevolence.
101
 The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection or 
another federal agency could also develop uniform corporate social 
responsibility standards and designate private organizations to verify 
compliance with them, as the Department of Agriculture did for organic 
food.
102
 Such marks could offer consumers and investors a verifiable option 
for identifying and comparing socially responsible companies and products 
and offer companies wishing to proclaim their CSR bona fides a credible 
way to do so. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
Recognized & Trusted Kosher Trademark, ORTHODOX UNION,  http://www.oukosher.org (last 
visited Sept. 7, 2011) (describing the O-U hechsher and mark) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 95. See FAIR TRADE USA, http://www.transfairusa.org (last visited Sept. 7, 2011) 
(defining what fair trade is and what the Fair Trade Certified label represents) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment); see also About the 
Good Housekeeping Seal: How Our Magazine and the GH Seal Protect You, GOOD 
HOUSEKEEPING, http://www.goodhousekeeping.com/product-testing/history/about-good-
housekeeping-seal (last visited Sept. 7, 2011) (describing the Good Housekeeping seal) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 96. See U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/leed (last visited Sept. 7, 
2011) (describing the LEED building designations) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 97. See FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, http://www.fsc.org (last visited Sept. 7, 2011) 
(describing the FSC certification process) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 98. See Judd F. Sneirson, Green Is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a New 
Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987, 1017–19 (2009) [hereinafter 
Sneirson, Green is Good] (discussing the “B Corporation” and how its mark signifies that a 
business meets certain high standards of social and environmental performance). 
 99. See, e.g., id. (describing the “B Corporation” mark and arrangement). 
 100. See Cherry & Sneirson, supra note 33, at 1034 (discussing how the private 
certification model can help to police corporate claims of social responsibility). 
 101. See Sneirson, Green is Good, supra note 98, at 1017–19 (describing the “B 
Corporation” mark and arrangement). 
 102. See Cherry & Sneirson, supra note 33, at 1034–35 (discussing the development of 
the USDA standards for organic-labeled food). 
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E.  Watchdogs 
 
A final means of keeping corporate claims of CSR in check is through 
“watchdogs,” like the activists who created the Chevron “we agree” 
spoofs.
103
 Some see tremendous potential in these groups’ power to reign in 
false CSR claims: “For the price of a URL and a little wit, a campaign that 
is out of step with reality can be hacked and become more of a liability than 
a potential benefit.”
104
 Of course, where a company or its environmental 
record is not in the public eye, the company is less likely to draw these 
individuals’ ire.
105
 Whether such a deterrent is enough to put an end to false 
claims of CSR remains to be seen, but this may prove a promising method 
for policing corporate greenwashing.  
 
III. Analysis of the “We Agree” Campaign 
 
In this Part, we now reexamine Chevron’s “we agree” campaign
106
 and 
analyze how such a campaign might fit into our framework for addressing 
greenwashing and faux CSR.
107
 
Chevron’s “we agree” campaign and website are in many ways at odds 
with its Ecuadorean activities.
108
 Chevron says that oil companies should 
protect the environment, that it does protect the environment, that it “places 
the highest priority on . . . the environment,”
109
 and that it conducts itself in a 
socially responsible and ethical manner.
110
 Chevron also states that it strives 
to “make a difference” in the communities where it does business, improving 
people’s “health . . . and welfare,” and generally supporting and benefiting 
                                                                                                                                      
 103. See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text (describing how activists responded to 
Chevron’s “we agree” campaign). 
 104. See Werbach, supra note 11 (“As times go on these sorts of campaigns will begin to 
diminish.”). 
 105. See Cherry & Sneirson, supra note 33, at 1002–04 (noting how, before its 2010 oil 
spill in the Gulf of Mexico, BP was largely admired by environmental groups and others for its 
perceived earth-friendly approach to doing business). 
 106. See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text (discussing the “we agree” campaign). 
 107. See supra Part II (setting forth our framework for policing greenwashing and faux 
CSR). 
 108. Chevron has also recently drawn criticism from environmentalists and a surprising 
number of its own shareholders for “fracking”—the controversial drilling method that involves 
injecting water and chemicals deep underground to fracture rock and release natural gas 
deposits.  See Cassandra Sweet, Chevron Investors Defeat Fracking Proposal, MARKET 
WATCH (May 25, 2011, 6:14 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/chevron-investors-
defeat-fracking-proposal-2011-05-25 (last visited Sept. 7, 2011) (noting approximately 40% of 
Chevron shareholders voted in favor of the shareholder proposal) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 109. Supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 110. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (describing Chevron’s vision and values). 
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“the communities [it is] part of.”
111
 These claims are complicated and depend 
on the timeframe being examined. For example, Chevron may follow these 
precepts even if Texaco did not during its tenure in Ecuador.
112
 
Other Chevron statements seem questionable upon closer inspection. 
For example, Chevron may invest millions of dollars on renewable 
alternatives to fossil fuels,
113
 but that is comparatively little for a company 
with a market capitalization of over $200 billion, and the company tellingly 
balances this statement with a reaffirmation of the importance of oil 
exploration and production.
114
 Chevron also says that it puts its profits to 
good use, but includes in that description paying its employees’ salaries 
(including $16 million to its CEO in 2010) and issuing its shareholders 
dividends each quarter.
115
 And in its statement about “protecting people and 
the environment” the company incongruously adds a reference to its assets: 
“We place the highest priority on the health and safety of our workforce and 
protection of our assets and the environment.”
116
 In other words, many of 
Chevron’s pro-CSR messages in fact reveal the company’s more or less 
conventional way of doing business. 
The value Chevron places on its assets is perhaps most apparent in its 
defense of the Ecuadorean lawsuit.
117
 Whereas Chevron writes on its website, 
“We accept responsibility and hold ourselves accountable for our work and 
our actions” and “respect the law,”
118
 its litigation strategy calls these claims 
into question. From the very outset of the Ecuadorean action, the company 
has disclaimed, not accepted, responsibility for its predecessor’s 
environmental actions, and now that the Ecuadorean court it sought to hear 
the case has found the company liable, Chevron is fighting around the globe 
                                                                                                                                      
 111. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (explaining the “Chevron Way”). 
 112. See supra notes 18, 23–25 and accompanying text (noting the timing of the pollution 
in Ecuador and Chevron’s acquisition of Texaco). 
 113. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (quoting Chevron’s “we agree” campaign 
about the company’s investments in geothermal, biofuel, and solar technologies). 
 114. Compare supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing Chevron’s time and 
financial commitment to renewable energy), with Chevron Corp., GOOGLE FIN., 
http://www.google.com/finance?q=NYSE:CVX (last visited Sept. 8, 2011) (listing Chevron’s 
financial information). 
 115. Compare supra note 6 and accompanying text (quoting Chevron’s statement about 
putting its profits to good use), with Chevron Corp., GOOGLE FIN.,  supra note 114 (containing 
information on Chevron’s executive compensation and dividend history), and Chevron Corp. 
(CVX), REUTERS, http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/officerProfile?symbol=CVX (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2011) (same). 
 116. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (describing Chevron’s position on 
protecting people, its workers, and the environment). 
 117. See supra notes 15–26 and accompanying text (describing the Ecuadorean plaintiffs’ 
lawsuit). 
 118. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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to prevent plaintiffs from collecting the judgment.
119
 Defending the lawsuit 
and appealing the trial court’s decision are of course not inconsistent with 
integrity, but prolonging the lawsuit for nearly twenty years in order to 
outspend and outlast its adversaries, and now working to deny plaintiffs even 
a rightful recovery, goes well beyond any definition of accepting 
responsibility. 
Still, there might be obstacles to customers wishing to bring a false 
advertising action based on these statements and actions. As the Nike case 
demonstrates, Chevron could not avoid such a claim on First Amendment 
grounds and would have to defend it on its merits.
120
 But, on the merits, 
Chevron could argue that even if it made false representations, they were 
meaningless puffery and in any event not material to a consumer’s gasoline 
purchase.
121
 This argument would track the argument Ford successfully made 
in the securities-fraud case discussed above,
122
 and its likelihood of success 
would turn on a court’s opinion of eco-conscious consumers’ choices.
123
 
Chevron investors might also encounter difficulty using Chevron’s 
advertising campaign and website
124
 as the basis for a securities-fraud 
action.
125
 Plaintiffs might be able to show both transaction and loss causation, 
assuming they purchased Chevron stock as a result of the company’s green 
advertising campaigns and Chevron’s stock price dropped as a result of the 
Ecuador lawsuit. However, even if Chevron shareholders could successfully 
prove the company’s CSR statements intentionally misleading, the statements 
might be deemed immaterial in that they would not have altered the “total 




                                                                                                                                      
 119. See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text (noting Chevron’s appeal and other 
efforts to prevent enforcement of a judgment in the Ecuadorean action). 
 120. See supra notes 64–69 and accompanying text (discussing the Nike case). 
 121. See supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text (discussing a Sixth Circuit case’s 
materiality analysis). 
 122. See id. 
 123. Based on the boycott of BP in the summer of 2010, there is evidence to suggest that 
consumers indeed change their gasoline consumption patterns on factors other than price. 
 124. See Advertising, supra note 1 (linking to Chevron’s advertising campaign). 
 125. Again, we do not discuss Chevron’s exposure to securities-fraud liability based on its 
SEC disclosures concerning the Ecuadorean lawsuit.  See Billenness & Lewis, supra note 36, at 
13–16 (analyzing possible securities-fraud claims against Chevron regarding the Ecuadorean 
litigation). 
 126. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (discussing 
materiality and whether statements in question altered the “total mix of information”).  
Ironically, the spoofed ads and public criticism contributed to the total mix of information on 
Chevron’s Ecuadorean activities, as well.  By contrast, before the BP oil spill, the total mix of 
information probably did not include the environmental and safety risks that BP undertook.  
See Cherry & Sneirson, supra note 33, at 1008 (noting the favorable impression BP enjoyed 
before the Deepwater Horizon disaster). 
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Given these obstacles, increased government regulation and mandated 
disclosure might be more useful in preventing faux CSR. CSR reporting, 
whether done voluntarily or mandated by the Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection, can provide objective, verifiable information on a company’s 
activities as opposed to the empty puff or vaguely positive statements many 
advertisements feature.
127
 And while puffery might be enough to escape 
false-advertising or securities-fraud liability, auditors for certification 
organizations and environmental activists may be less easily fooled and better 






 All too often, the statements and promises of CSR have been found to 
be overblown blandishments, the afterthought of a clever marketing 
department, or part of a public-relations effort to control damage through 
greenwashing. That seems to be the case with Chevron’s “we agree” 
campaign, which is particularly unfortunate in that such faux CSR can 
breed cynicism toward genuine CSR and the firms that actively engage in 
it. Corporate claims of social responsibility need to be policed, and the 
Chevron example demonstrates that civil actions by consumers and 
investors cannot do the job alone. Certifying organizations and watchdog 
groups can pick up some of this slack, restoring trust with consumers and 
investors who wish to do business with socially responsible and sustainable 
businesses. CSR disclosures can also play an important role, transforming 
corporate communications that would otherwise raise suspicions of 
greenwashing into informative and reliable accounts of corporate behavior. 
                                                                                                                                      
 127. See supra Part II.C (analyzing the Dodd-Frank provisions that could form the basis 
of CSR disclosure requirements).  
 128. See supra Parts II.D & II.E (discussing certifications and watchdog groups). 
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